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Abstract: This is a companion paper of [Mixed equilibrium solution of time-inconsistent stochastic
LQ problem, arXiv:1802.03032], where general theory has been established to characterize the open-loop
equilibrium control, feedback equilibrium strategy and mixed equilibrium solution for a time-inconsistent
stochastic linear-quadratic problem. This note is, on the one hand to test the developed theory of that
paper, and on the other hand to push the solvability of multi-period mean-variance portfolio selection. A
nondegenerate assumption has been removed in this note, which is popular in existing literature about
multi-period mean-variance portfolio selection; and neat conditions have been obtained to characterize the
existence of equilibrium solutions.
Key words: time-inconsistency, multi-period mean-variance portfolio selection, stochastic linear-
quadratic optimal control
1 Introduction
Recently, a notion named mixed equilibrium solution is introduced in [10] for the time-inconsistent stochastic
linear-quadratic (LQ, for short) optimal control; it contains two different parts: a pure-feedback-strategy
part and an open-loop-control part, which together constitute a time-consistent solution. It is shown that
the open-loop-control part will be of the feedback form of the equilibrium state. If we let the pure-feedback-
strategy part be zero or let the open-loop-control part be independent of the initial state, then the mixed
equilibrium solution will reduce to the open-loop equilibrium control and the (linear) feedback equilibrium
strategy, respectively, both of which have been extensively studied in existing literature [1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 11,
12, 16, 18, 19]. Furthermore, the mixed equilibrium solution is not a hollow concept, whose study will give
us more flexibility to deal with the time-inconsistent optimal control.
The multi-period mean-variance portfolio selection is a particular example of time-inconsistent problem.
In fact, the recent developments in time-inconsistent problems and the revisits of multi-period mean-variance
portfolio selection [1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7] are mutually stimulated. The (single-period) mean-variance formulation
initiated by Markowitz [9] is the cornerstone of modern portfolio theory and is widely used in both academic
and financial industry. The multi-period mean-variance portfolio selection is the natural extension of [9],
which has been extensively studied. Until 2000 and for the first time, Li-Ng [8] and Zhou-Li [20] reported
the analytical pre-commitment optimal policies for the discrete-time case and the continuous-time case,
respectively.
To proceed, consider a capital market consisting of one riskless asset and m risky assets within a time
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horizon N . Let sk(> 1) be a given deterministic return of the riskless asset at time period k and ek =
(e1k, · · · , e
m
k )
T the vector of random returns of the m risky assets at period k. We assume that vectors
ek, k = 0, 1, · · · , N−1, are statistically independent and the only information known about the random return
vector ek is its first two moments: its mean E(ek) = (Ee
1
k,Ee
2
k, · · · ,Ee
m
k )
T and its covariance Cov(ek) =
E[(ek − Eek)(ek − Eek)
T ]. Clearly, Cov(ek) is nonnegative definite, i.e., Cov(ek)  0.
Let Xk ∈ R be the wealth of the investor at the beginning of the k-th period, and let u
i
k, i = 1, 2, · · · ,m,
be the amount invested in the i-th risky asset at period k. Then, Xk −
∑m
i=1 u
i
k is the amount invested in
the riskless asset at period k, and the wealth at the beginning of the (k + 1)-th period [8] is given by
Xk+1 =
n∑
i=1
eiku
i
k +
(
Xk −
m∑
i=1
uik
)
sk = skXk +O
T
k uk, (1.1)
where Ok is the excess return vector of risky assets [8] defined as Ok = (O
1
k, O
2
k, · · · , O
m
k )
T = (e1k − sk, e
2
k −
sk, · · · , e
m
k − sk)
T . In this section, we consider the case where short-selling of stocks is allowed, i.e., uik, i =
1, ..., k, can be taken values in R. This leads to a multi-period mean-variance portfolio selection formulation.
Throughout this paper, we let Fk = σ(eℓ, ℓ = 0, 1, · · · , k− 1), k = 0, ..., N − 1. Then, a time-inconsistent
version of multi-period mean-variance problem [8] can be formulated as follows:
Problem (MV). Let t ∈ T and x ∈ l2F (t;R). Find u
∗ ∈ l2F (Tt;R
m) such that
J(t, x;u∗) = inf
u∈l2
F
(Tt;Rm)
J(t, x;u).
Here, T = {0, ..., N − 1}, Tt = {t, ..., N − 1}, and
l2F(t;R) =
{
νt
∣∣νt ∈ R is Ft-measurable, E|νt|2 <∞.} ,
l2F(Tt;R
m) =
{
{νk, k ∈ Tt}
∣∣νk ∈ Rm is Fk-measurable,E|νk|2 <∞, k ∈ Tt} ;
furthermore,
J(t, x;u) = Et(XN − EtXN)
2 − (µ1x+ µ2)EtXN ,
which is subject to {
Xk+1 = skXk +O
T
k uk,
Xt = x, k ∈ Tt
with µ1, µ2 > 0 the trade-off parameters between the mean and the variance of the terminal wealth.
It should be mentioned that Problem (MV) above has two unconventional features: the term (µ1x)
TEtXN
makes J(t, x;u) a state-dependent (or rank-dependent) utility, and the cost functional J(t, x;u) involves the
nonlinear terms of the conditional expectation of state and control variables. It is known now that any of the
two features will ruin the time-consistency of optimal control, namely, Bellman’s principle of optimality will
no longer work for Problem (MV). Note that the above model is more general than that of [11]; in Section
V of [11], the case without (µ1x)
TEtXN is dealt with.
In [8], realizing the time-inconsistency (called nonseparability there), Li and Ng derived the optimal
policy of multi-period mean-variance portfolio selection using an embedding scheme. Note that the optimal
policy of [8] is with respect to the initial pair, i.e., it is optimal only when viewed at the initial time. This
derivation is called the pre-committed optimal solution now. By applying a pre-committed optimal control
(for an initial pair), we find that it is not an optimal control for the intertemporal initial pair. Though the
pre-committed optimal solution is of some practical and theoretical values, it neglects and has not really
addressed the time-inconsistency.
In recent years, there is a surge to study the time-inconsistent optimal control together with the revisit to
multi-period mean-variance portfolio selection [1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 11, 12, 16, 18, 19]. Two kinds of time-consistent
equilibrium solutions are investigated in these papers, which are the open-loop equilibrium control and the
closed-loop equilibrium strategy. To compare, open-loop formulation is to find an open-loop equilibrium
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“control”, while the “strategy” is the object of closed-loop formulation. Strotz’s equilibrium solution [14]
is essentially a closed-loop equilibrium strategy, which is further elaborately developed by Yong to the LQ
optimal control [16, 19] as well as the nonlinear optimal control [18, 17, 15]. In contrast, open-loop equilibrium
control is extensively studied by Hu-Jin-Zhou [6, 7], Yong [19], Ni-Zhang-Krstic [11], and Qi-Zhang[12]. In
particular, the closed-loop formulation can be viewed as the extension of Bellman’s dynamic programming,
and the corresponding equilibrium strategy (if it exists) is derived by a backward procedure [16, 17, 18, 19].
Differently, the open-loop equilibrium control is characterized via the maximum-principle-like methodology
[6, 7, 11].
It is noted that some nondegenerate assumptions are posed in [1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8]. Specifically, the
volatilities of the stocks in [1, 2, 6, 7] and the return rates of the risky securities in [4, 5, 8] are assumed
to be nondegenerate, i.e., Cov(ek) ≻ 0, k ∈ T. To make the formulation more practical, it is natural to
consider, at least in theory, how to generalize these results to the case where degeneracy is allowed. In fact,
mean-variance portfolio selection problems with degenerate covariance matrices may date back to 1970s.
In [3] or the “corrected” version [13], Buser et al propose the single-period version with possibly singular
covariance matrix. Clearly, such class of problems are more general than the classical ones [9], and more
consistent with the reality.
In this note, we do not pose the nondegenerate assumption and want to find the conditions such that the
time-consistent equilibrium solutions of Problem (MV) exist. This is done by using the theory developed by
[10]. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives the definitions of equilibrium solutions,
whose existence is investigated in Section 3. In Section 4, an example of [8] is revisited.
2 Equilibrium solutions
In the following, we shall introduce three equilibrium solutions for Problem (MV), which are the open-loop
equilibrium control, feedback equilibrium strategy and mixed equilibrium solution. Note that the following
notions are consistent with those of [10]. Throughout this note, Problem (MV) for the initial pair (t, x) will
be simply denoted as Problem (MV)tx.
Definition 2.1. i). At stage k ∈ Tt, a function fk(·) is called an admissible feedback strategy (or simply
a feedback strategy) if for any ζ ∈ l2F(k;R), fk(ζ) ∈ l
2
F (k;R
m), where
l2F(k;R
m) =
{
νk
∣∣νk ∈ Rm is Fk-measurable, E|νk|2 <∞.} .
The set of such type of f ′ks is denoted by Fk, and Ft × · · · × FN−1 is denoted by FTt .
ii). Let f = (ft, ..., fN−1) ∈ FTt . For k ∈ Tt and ζ ∈ l
2
F (k;R), fk(ζ) can be divided into two parts, namely,
fk(ζ) = f
c
k + f
p
k (ζ); here, f
c
k is the part of fk that has nothing to do with ζ (its derivative with respect to ζ
is 0), and the remainder fpk (·) is the pure-feedback-strategy part of fk. Furthermore, (f
p
t , ..., f
p
N−1) is called
a pure feedback strategy.
Definition 2.2. i). A strategy ψ ∈ FTt is called a feedback equilibrium strategy of Problem (MV)t,x, if
the following two points hold:
a) ψ does not depend on x;
b) For any k ∈ Tt and uk ∈ l
2
F(k;R
m), it holds that
J
(
k,X
t,x,∗
k ; (ψ ·X
k,ψ)|Tk
)
≤ J
(
k,X
t,x,∗
k ; (uk, (ψ ·X
k,uk,ψ)|Tk+1)
)
. (2.1)
In (2.1), (ψ ·Xk,ψ)|Tk and (ψ ·X
k,uk,ψ)|Tk+1 (with Tk = {k, ..., N − 1},Tk+1 = {k+ 1, ..., N − 1}) are given
by
(ψ ·Xk,ψ)|Tk =
(
ψk(X
k,ψ
k ), ..., ψN−1(X
k,ψ
N−1)
)
,
(ψ ·Xk,uk,ψ)|Tk+1 =
(
ψk+1(X
k,uk,ψ
k+1 ), ..., ψN−1(X
k,uk,ψ
N−1 )
)
,
where Xk,ψ, Xk,uk,ψ are as follows{
X
k,ψ
ℓ+1 = sℓX
k,ψ
ℓ +O
T
ℓ ψℓ(X
k,ψ
ℓ ),
X
k,ψ
k = X
t,x,∗
k , ℓ ∈ Tk,
(2.2)
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
X
k,uk,ψ
ℓ+1 = sℓX
k,uk,ψ
ℓ +O
T
ℓ ψℓ(X
k,uk,ψ
ℓ ),
X
k,uk,ψ
k+1 = skX
k,uk,ψ
k +O
T
ℓ uk,
X
k,uk,ψ
k = X
t,x,∗
k , ℓ ∈ Tk+1.
(2.3)
Furthermore, in (2.1), (2.2) and (2.3), Xt,x,∗ is given by{
X
t,x,∗
k+1 = skX
t,x,∗
k +O
T
k ψk(X
t,x,∗
k ),
X
t,x,∗
t = x, k ∈ Tt.
ii). Let (Ψ, γ) ∈ l2(Tt;R
m)× l2F(Tt;R
m) with
l2(Tt;R
m) =
{
{νk, k ∈ Tt}
∣∣∣νk ∈ Rm, |νk|2 <∞, k ∈ Tt} .
If Ψ and γ do not depend on x, and ψ of i) is equal to (Ψ, γ), namely,
ψk(ξ) = Ψkξ + γk, k ∈ Tt, ξ ∈ l
2
F (k;R
n),
then (Ψ, γ) is called a linear feedback equilibrium strategy of Problem (MV)tx.
Definition 2.3. A control ut,x ∈ l2F(Tt;R
m) is called an open-loop equilibrium control of Problem
(MV)tx, if
J
(
k,X
t,x,∗
k ;u
t,x|Tk
)
≤ J
(
k,X
t,x,∗
k ; (uk, u
t,x|Tk+1)
)
(2.4)
holds for any k ∈ Tt and uk ∈ l
2
F(k;R
m). Here, ut,x|Tk and u
t,x|Tk+1 are the restrictions of u
t,x on Tk and
Tk+1, respectively; and X
t,x,∗ is given by{
X
t,x,∗
k+1 = skX
t,x,∗
k +O
T
k u
t,x
k ,
X
t,x,∗
t = x, k ∈ Tt.
Definition 2.4. i). A pair (Φ, vt,x) ∈ l2(Tt;R
m)× l2F (Tt;R
m) is called a mixed equilibrium solution of
Problem (MV)tx, if the following two points hold:
a) Φ does not depend on x, and vt,x depends on x;
b) For any k ∈ Tt and uk ∈ l
2
F(k;R
m), it holds that
J
(
k,X
t,x,∗
k ; (Φ ·X
k,Φ + vt,x)|Tk
)
≤ J
(
k,X
t,x,∗
k ; (uk, (Φ ·X
k,uk,Φ + vt,x)|Tk+1)
)
. (2.5)
In (2.5), (Φ ·Xk,Φ + vt,x)|Tk and (Φ ·X
k,uk,Φ + vt,x)|Tk+1 are given, respectively, by(
ΦkX
k,Φ
k + v
t,x
k , · · · ,ΦN−1X
k,Φ
N−1 + v
t,x
N−1
)
,(
Φk+1X
k,uk,Φ
k+1 + v
t,x
k+1, · · · ,ΦN−1X
k,uk,Φ
N−1 + v
t,x
N−1
)
,
where Xk,Φ, Xk,uk,Φ are defined by{
X
k,Φ
ℓ+1 =
(
sk +O
T
k Φk
)
X
k,Φ
k +O
T
k v
t,x
k ,
X
k,Φ
k = X
t,x,∗
k , k ∈ Tt, ℓ ∈ Tk,
(2.6)

X
k,uk,Φ
ℓ+1 =
(
sk +O
T
k Φk
)
X
k,uk,Φ
k + v
t,x
k ,
X
k,uk,Φ
k+1 = skX
k,uk,Φ
k +O
T
k uk,
X
k,uk,Φ
k = X
t,x,∗
k , ℓ ∈ Tk+1.
(2.7)
The state Xt,x,∗k in (2.5), (2.6) and (2.7) is computed via{
X
t,x,∗
k+1 =
(
sk +O
T
k Φk
)
X
t,x,∗
k +O
T
k v
t,x
k ,
X
t,x,∗
t = x, k ∈ Tt.
ii). Φ and vt,x in i) are called, respectively, the pure-feedback-strategy part and the open-loop-control part
of the mixed equilibrium solution (Φ, vt,x).
iii). Letting Φ = 0 in i), the corresponding vt,x satisfying (2.4) is called an open-loop equilibrium control
of Problem (MV)tx.
iv). If (Φ, vt,x) does not depend on x, then it is a linear feedback equilibrium strategy of Problem (MV)tx.
Remark 2.5. By the definition, a mixed equilibrium solution (Φ, vt,x) is time-consistent in the sense
that (Φ, vt,x)|Tk is a mixed equilibrium solution for the initial pair (k,X
t,x,∗
k ). Since (Φ ·X
k,Φ + vt,x)|Tk =(
ΦkX
k,Φ
k + v
t,x
k , (Φ ·X
k,Φ+ vt,x)|Tk+1
)
, we obtain (uk, (Φ ·X
k,ut,Φ+ vt,x)|Tk+1)
)
from (Φ ·Xk,Φ+ vt,x)|Tk by
not only replacing ΦkX
k,Φ
k + v
t,x
k with uk but also replacing X
k,Φ with Xk,uk,Φ. Furthermore, it is valuable
to mention that vt,x’s in both sides of (2.5) are the same. This is why we call Φ the pure-feedback-strategy
part and vt,x the open-loop-control part.
3 Characterization on the equilibrium solutions
To solve Problem (MV)tx, we shall transform (1.1) into a linear controlled system with multiplicative noises
so that the general theory [10] can work. Precisely, define
wik = e
i
k − sk − E(e
i
k − sk),
Dik = (0, · · · , 0, 1, 0, · · · , 0),
i = 1, · · · , n, k = 0, 1, · · · , N − 1,
where the i-th entry of Dik is 1. Then, {wk = (w
1
k, ..., w
n
k )
T , k ∈ T} is a martingale difference sequence as
ek, k = 0, .., N − 1, are statistically independent. Furthermore,
Ek[wkw
T
k ] = E[wkw
T
k ] = Cov(ek) = (δ
ij
k )n×n.
This leads to {
Xk+1 = (skXk + (EOk)
Tuk) +
∑n
i=1D
i
kukw
i
k,
Xt = x, k ∈ Tt.
(3.1)
We firstly characterize the open-loop equilibrium portfolio control of Problem (MV)tx.
Theorem 3.1. The following statements are equivalent:
i) For any t ∈ T and x ∈ l2F(t;R), Problem (MV)tx admits an open-loop equilibrium control.
ii) EOk ∈ Ran(Cov(Ok)), k ∈ Tt.
Under any of the above conditions,
v
t,x
k = −Ô
†
kL̂kX
t,x,∗
k − Ô
†
kθ̂k, k ∈ Tt
is an open-loop equilibrium control of Problem (MV)tx, where{
X̂
t,x,∗
k+1 =
(
sk −O
T
k Ô
†
kL̂k
)
X̂
t,x,∗
k −O
T
k Ô
†
kθ̂k,
X̂
t,x,∗
t = x, k ∈ Tt,
and 
Ôk =
(
Ŝk+1 + T̂k+1
)
Cov(Ok),
L̂k = −
µ1
2 sk+1 · · · sN−1EOk,
θ̂k = −
µ2
2 sk+1 · · · sN−1EOk,
k ∈ Tt
(3.2)
with {
Ŝk + T̂k =
(
Ŝk+1 + T̂k+1
)
s2k − sk
(
Ŝk+1 + T̂k+1
)
(EOk)
T Ô†kL̂k,
ŜN + T̂N = 1, k ∈ Tt
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Proof. This result is proved according to Theorem 3.11 of [10]. In this case, (3.21)-(3.23) of Theorem
3.11 of [10] become to
Ŝk = s
2
kŜk+1, Ŝk = s
2
kŜk+1 ≡ 0,
ŜN = 1, ŜN = 0,
Ôk = (EOk)Ŝk+1(EOk)
T +
∑p
i,j=1 δ
ij
k (D
i
k)
T Ŝk+1D
j
k = Ŝk+1Cov(Ok)  0,
k ∈ T,
(3.3)

T̂k = s
2
kT̂k+1 − sk
(
Ŝk+1 + T̂k+1
)
(EOk)
T Ô†kL̂k,
T̂k = T̂k+1
[
s2k − sk(EOk)
T Ô†kL̂k
]
≡ 0,
T̂N = 0, T̂N = 0,
ÔkÔ
†
kL̂k − L̂k = 0,
k ∈ T,
(3.4)
and 
π̂k = skπ̂k+1,
π̂N = −
µ2
2 ,
ÔkÔ
†
kθ̂k − θ̂k = 0,
k ∈ T,
(3.5)
where 
Ôk =
∑p
i,j=1 δ
ij
k (D
i
k)
T
(
Ŝk+1 + T̂k+1
)
D
j
k =
(
Ŝk+1 + T̂k+1
)
Cov(Ok),
L̂k = Ûk+1EOk,
θ̂k = π̂k+1EOk,
k ∈ T
with 
Ûk = skÛk+1,
ÛN = −
µ1
2 ,
k ∈ T.
From (3.3), (3.4) and (3.5), we have
Ŝk + T̂k =
(
Ŝk+1 + T̂k+1
)
s2k − sk
(
Ŝk+1 + T̂k+1
)
(EOk)
T Ô†kL̂k,
ŜN + T̂N = 1,
ÔkÔ
†
kL̂k − L̂k = 0,
k ∈ T.
By some calculations, we have
Ŝk + T̂k =
(
Ŝk+1 + T̂k+1
)
s2k + sksk+1 · · · sN−1
µ1
2
(
Ŝk+1 + T̂k+1
)(
Ŝk+1 + T̂k+1
)†
(EOk)
T
[
Cov(Ok)
]†
EOk,
where
(
Ŝk+1 + T̂k+1
)†
equals to
(
Ŝk+1 + T̂k+1
)−1
if Ŝk+1 + T̂k+1 6= 0; otherwise, it will be 0. Therefore,
(
Ŝk+1 + T̂k+1
)(
Ŝk+1 + T̂k+1
)†
=
{
1, Ŝk+1 + T̂k+1 6= 0,
0, Ŝk+1 + T̂k+1 = 0.
As sk > 1, µ1 > 0,Cov(Ok)  0, k ∈ T, and ŜN + T̂N = 1, it follows that Ŝk + T̂k > 0, k ∈ T. This
together with π̂k 6= 0, Ûk 6= 0, k ∈ T implies that the solvability of (3.3)-(3.5) is equivalent to the property
EOk ∈ Ran(Cov(Ok)), k ∈ T. Then, the proof is completed by following Theorem 3.11 of [10]. 
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Corollary 3.2. Let Cov(Ok) ≻ 0, k ∈ T. Then, for any t ∈ T and x ∈ l
2
F(t;R), Problem (MV) admits a
unique open-loop equilibrium control, which is given by vt,xk = −Ô
−1
k L̂kX
t,x,∗
k − Ô
−1
k θ̂k, k ∈ Tt with{
X̂
t,x,∗
k+1 =
(
sk −O
T
k Ô
−1
k L̂k
)
X̂
t,x,∗
k −O
T
k Ô
−1
k θ̂k,
X̂
t,x,∗
t = x, k ∈ Tt,
and Ôk, L̂k, θ̂k, k ∈ Tt, are given in (3.2).
Proof. This follows from Theorem 3.9 of [10] and Theorem 3.1. 
The following result is based on Theorem 3.13 of [10], which is about the feedback equilibrium strategy
of Problem (MV)tx.
Theorem 3.3. The following statements are equivalent:
i) For any t ∈ T and x ∈ l2F(t;R), Problem (MV)tx admits a feedback equilibrium strategy.
ii) The difference equations
S˜k = S˜k+1
[
s2k − 2sk(EOk)
T O˜
†
kL˜k + L˜
T
k O˜
†
kE(OkO
T
k )O˜
†
kL˜k
]
,
S˜k = s
2
kS˜k+1 − 2skS˜k+1(EOk)
T
O˜
†
kL˜k + L˜
T
k O˜
†
kL˜k,
S˜N = 1, S˜N = 0,
O˜k  0, O˜kO˜
†
kL˜k = L˜k,
k ∈ T,
(3.6)
and 
π˜k = −β˜kO˜
†
kθ˜k +
(
sk − (EOk)
T O˜
†
kL˜k
)T
π˜k+1,
πN = −
µ2
2 ,
O˜kO˜
†
kθ˜k = θ˜k,
k ∈ T
(3.7)
are solvable, namely, 
O˜k  0,
O˜kO˜
†
kL˜k = L˜k,
O˜kO˜
†
kθ˜k = θ˜k,
k ∈ T,
holds, where 
O˜k = S˜k+1EOk(EOk)
T + S˜k+1Cov(Ok),
L˜k =
(
skS˜k+1 + U˜k+1
)
EOk,
θ˜k = π˜k+1EOk,
k ∈ T
(3.8)
with 
U˜k =
(
sk − (EOk)
T O˜
†
kL˜k
)
U˜k+1,
U˜N = −
µ1
2 ,
k ∈ T,
and 
β˜k = skS˜k+1(EOk)
T − L˜Tk O˜
†
k
[
S˜k+1EOk(EOk)
T
+ S˜k+1Cov(Ok)
]
,
k ∈ T.
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Theorem 3.4. If EOk ∈ Ran(Ok), k ∈ T, then (3.6) and (3.7) are solvable, and for any t ∈ T and
x ∈ l2F (t;R), Problem (MV)tx admits a feedback equilibrium strategy (Φ
t, vt) with
Φt = {−O˜†kL˜k, k ∈ Tt}, v
t = {−O˜†kθ˜k, k ∈ Tt},
where O˜k, L˜k, θ˜k, k ∈ Tt, are given in (3.8).
Proof. Note that (3.6) can be equivalently rewritten as
S˜k = S˜k+1
[(
sk − (EOk)
T O˜
†
kL˜k
)2
+ L˜Tk O˜
†
kCov(Ok)O˜
†
kL˜k
]
,
S˜k = S˜k+1
(
sk − (EOk)
T O˜
†
kL˜k
)2
+ S˜k+1L˜
T
k O˜
†
kCov(Ok)O˜
†
kL˜k,
S˜N = 1, S˜N = 0,
O˜k  0, O˜kO˜
†
kL˜k = L˜k,
k ∈ T.
(3.9)
Clearly, S˜k ≥ S˜k ≥ 0, k ∈ T.
Let EOk ∈ Ran(Cov(Ok)), k ∈ T. We now prove that (3.6) and (3.7) are solvable. For a generic k ∈ T,
we prove the conclusion by the following two cases.
Case 1: S˜k > 0. This implies S˜ℓ > 0,
(
sℓ − (EOℓ)
T O˜
†
ℓL˜ℓ
)2
+ L˜Tℓ O˜
†
ℓCov(Oℓ)O˜
†
ℓL˜ℓ > 0, ℓ ∈ Tk. If
skS˜k+1 + U˜k+1 = 0, then L˜k = 0 and (3.9) is solvable at k. To the end of this paragraph, we assume
skS˜k+1 + U˜k+1 6= 0. If further S˜k+1 = 0, then L˜k ∈ Ran(O˜k) and (3.9) is solvable at k. On the other hand,
let S˜k+1 6= 0. As EOk ∈ Ran(Cov(Ok)), there exists ξ ∈ R
n such that Cov(Ok)ξ = EOk. Furthermore,
ξTCov(Ok)ξ = ξ
TEOk ≥ 0. Then,
O˜k
skS˜k+1 + U˜k+1
S˜k+1ξTEOk + S˜k+1
ξ =
skS˜k+1 + U˜k+1
S˜k+1ξTEOk + S˜k+1
(
S˜k+1EOk(EOk)
T ξ + S˜k+1Cov(Ok)ξ
)
=
(
skS˜k+1 + U˜k+1
)
EOk = L˜k.
Hence, O˜kO˜
†
kL˜k = L˜k, and (3.9) is solvable at k. By a similar procedure, we can prove the solvability of
(3.7) at k.
Case 2: S˜k = 0. If S˜k+1 > 0, the proof of the solvability of (3.7) and (3.9) at k is similar to that of Case
1, and is omitted here. If S˜k+1 = 0, S˜k+2 > 0, we have O˜k = 0 and
sk+1 − (EOk+1)
T
O˜
†
k+1L˜k+1 = L˜
T
k+1O˜
†
k+1Cov(Ok+1)O˜
†
k+1L˜k+1 = 0, (3.10)
which further implies U˜k+1 = 0 and L˜k = 0; hence, (3.9) is solvable at k. Furthermore, (3.10) implies
L˜Tk+1O˜
†
k+1Cov(Ok+1) = 0. From this and (3.10) we have β˜k+1 = 0 and π˜k+1 = 0, and hence (3.7) is solvable
at k under the condition of S˜k+1 = 0, S˜k+2 > 0. Finally, if S˜k+1 = 0, S˜k+2 = 0, we must have some
τ > k + 1 such that S˜τ = 0, S˜τ+1 > 0. Similar to the comments below (3.10), we have U˜τ = β˜τ = π˜τ = 0,
which implies U˜k+1 = 0 and the solvability of (3.9) at k. As O˜ℓ = 0, ℓ ∈ {k, ..., τ − 1}, it follows that
π˜k+1 =
(
sk+1 − (EOk+1)
T O˜
†
k+1L˜k+1
)T
· · ·
(
sτ−1 − (EOτ−1)
T O˜
†
τ−1L˜τ−1
)T
π˜τ = 0. Hence, (3.7) is solvable at
k.
In summary, for a generic k ∈ T, we have proved the solvability of (3.7) and (3.9) at k, namely, O˜kO˜
†
kL˜k =
L˜k and O˜kO˜
†
kθ˜k = θ˜k. From Theorem 3.13 of [10] and Theorem 3.3, we can complete the proof. 
Theorem 3.5. Let Cov(Ok) ≻ 0, k ∈ T. Then, for any t ∈ T and x ∈ l
2
F(t;R), Problem (MV)tx
admits a unique feedback equilibrium strategy, which is given by (Φt, vt) with Φt = {−O˜−1k L˜k, k ∈ Tt},
vt = {−O˜−1k θ˜k, k ∈ Tt}, where O˜k, L˜k, θ˜k, k ∈ Tt, are given in (3.8).
Proof. In this case, (3.6) and (3.7) are solvable. From (3.9), we know that S˜k > 0, k ∈ T. In fact, suppose
S˜k0 = 0 and S˜k0+1 6= 0 for some k0 ∈ T, then
sk0 − (EOk0 )
T
O˜
†
k0
L˜k0 = L˜
T
k0
O˜
†
k0
Cov(Ok0 )O˜
†
k0
L˜k0 = 0.
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As Cov(Ok0) ≻ 0, it follows O˜
†
k0
L˜k0 = 0, which implies 0 = sk0 − (EOk0 )
T
O˜
†
k0
L˜k0 = sk0 . This is impossible,
and thus S˜k > 0, k ∈ T. Furthermore, we have O˜k ≻ 0, k ∈ T. This completes the proof. 
We now consider the mixed equilibrium portfolio solution. In this case, (3.26)-(3.28) of [10] read as
Sk = Sk+1
[(
sk + (EOk)
TΦk
)2
+ΦTkCov(Ok)Φk
]
,
Sk = Sk+1
(
sk + (EOk)
TΦk
)2
+ Sk+1Φ
T
kCov(Ok)Φk,
SN = 1, SN = 0,
Ok = Sk+1EOk(EOk)
T + Sk+1Cov(Ok)  0,
k ∈ T,
(3.11)

Tk = Sk+1
[(
sk + (EOk)
TΦk
)
(EOk)
T +ΦTkCov(Ok)
](
−O†kLk − Φk
)
+ Tk+1
[(
sk + (EOk)
TΦk
)(
sk − (EOk)
TO†kLk
)
− ΦTkCov(Ok)O
†
kLk
]
,
Tk =
[
Sk+1
(
sk + (EOk)
TΦk
)
(EOk)
T + Sk+1Φ
T
kCov(Ok)
](
−O†kLk − Φk
)
+
[
Tk+1
(
sk + (EOk)
TΦk
)(
sk − (EOk)
TO†kLk
)
− Tk+1Φ
T
kCov(Ok)O
†
kLk
]
,
TN = 0, TN = 0,
OkO
†
kLk = Lk,
k ∈ T,
(3.12)
and 
πk = −βkO
†
kθk +
(
sk + (EOk)
TΦk
)T
πk+1,
πN = −
µ2
2 ,
OkO
†
kθk = θk,
k ∈ T,
(3.13)
where 
Ok =
(
Sk+1 + Tk+1
)
EOk(EOk)
T +
(
Sk,k+1 + Tk,k+1
)
Cov(Ok),
Lk = sk
(
Sk+1 + Tk+1
)
EOk + Uk+1EOk,
θk = πk+1EOk,
k ∈ T,
with Uk =
(
sk + (EOk)
TΦk
)
Uk+1, UN = −
µ1
2 , k ∈ T, and βk =
(
Sk+1 + Tk+1
)(
sk + Φ
T
k EOk
)
(EOk)
T +(
Sk+1 + Tk+1
)
ΦTkCov(Ok), k ∈ T. From (3.11)-(3.12), we obtain
Sk + Tk = (Sk+1 + Tk+1)
[(
sk + (EOk)
TΦk
)(
sk − (EOk)
TO†kLk
)
− ΦTkCov(Ok)O
†
kLk
]
,
Sk + Tk = (Sk+1 + Tk+1)
(
sk + (EOk)
TΦk
)(
sk − (EOk)
TO†kLk
)
− (Sk+1 + Tk+1)Φ
T
kCov(Ok)O
†
kLk,
k ∈ T.
Note that for any k ∈ T, Ok  0, (3.11) is solvable. By Theorem 3.14 of [10], the following result is
straightforward.
Proposition 3.6. Assume that there exists Φ ∈ l2(T;Rm) such that (3.12) (3.13) are solvable. For any
t ∈ T and x ∈ l2F (t;R), let
v
t,x
k = −(O
†
kLk +Φk)X
t,x,∗
k −O
†
kθk, k ∈ Tt,
where {
X
t,x,∗
k+1 =
(
sk −O
T
kO
†
kLk
)
X
t,x,∗
k −O
T
kO
†
kθk,
X
t,x,∗
t = x, k ∈ Tt
Then, (Φ|Tt , v
t,x) is a mixed equilibrium solution of Problem (MV)tx.
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4 Revisiting an example of [8]
Consider a multi-period mean-variance portfolio selection problem (Example 2 of [8]). A capital market
consists of one riskless asset and three risky assets over a finite time horizon N = 4, and the parameters of
the model are as follows
x = 1, sk = 1.04, Ee
1
k = 1.162, Ee
2
k = 1.246,
Ee3k = 1.228, k = 0, 1, 2, 3,
and the covariance of ek = (e
1
k, e
2
k, e
3
k)
T is
Cov(ek) =
 0.0146 0.0187 0.01450.0187 0.0854 0.0104
0.0145 0.0104 0.0289
 ≻ 0, k = 0, 1, 2, 3.
In this paper, we assume µ1 = µ2 = 1. Clearly,
EOk = (0.1220, 0.2060, 0.1880)
T , k = 0, 1, 2, 3.
As Cov(Ok) = Cov(ek) ≻ 0, k = 0, 1, 2, 3, this Problem (MV) will have a unique open-loop equilibrium
control and a unique feedback equilibrium strategy. In what follows, we will compute the equilibrium
solutions, respectively.
Open-loop equilibrium control
By (3.2) and some calculations, we have
−Ô†3L̂3 =
 0.47390.7689
2.7381
 , − Ô†2L̂2 =
 0.26760.4341
1.5461
 ,
−Ô†1L̂1 =
 0.18420.2988
1.0643
 , − Ô†0L̂0 =
 0.13910.2257
0.8038
 ,
−Ô†3θ̂3 =
 0.47390.7689
2.7381
 , − Ô†2θ̂2 =
 0.26760.4341
1.5461
 ,
−Ô†1θ̂1 =
 0.18420.2988
1.0643
 , − Ô†0θ̂0 =
 0.13910.2257
0.8038
 ,
Then, the unique open-loop equilibrium portfolio control for the initial pair (0, x) is given by
v
0,x
k = −Ô
†
kL̂kX
0,x,∗
k − Ô
†
kθ̂k
with {
X̂
0,x,∗
k+1 =
(
sk −O
T
k Ô
†
kL̂k
)
X̂
0,x,∗
k −O
T
k Ô
†
kθ̂k,
X̂
0,x,∗
0 = x, k = 0, 1, 2, 3.
Feedback equilibrium strategy
By (3.6), (3.7) and some calculations, we have
−O˜†3L˜3 =
 0.47390.7689
2.7381
 , − O˜†2L˜2 =
 0.03330.0540
0.1923
 ,
−O˜†1L˜1 =
 0.01680.0273
0.0971
 , − O˜†0L˜0 =
 0.00770.0124
0.0443
 ,
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−O˜†3θ˜3 =
 0.47390.7689
2.7381
 , − O˜†2θ˜2 =
 0.12210.1981
0.7055
 ,
−O˜†1θ˜1 =
 0.09220.1496
0.5328
 , − O˜†0θ˜0 =
 0.07300.1185
0.4220
 ,
Then, the unique feedback equilibrium strategy is given by {(−O˜†kL˜k,−O˜
†
kθ˜k), k = 0, 1, 2, 3}.
Mixed equilibrium solution
We use the command “randn” of MATLAB to randomly generate a Φ = {Φk, k = 0, 1, 2, 3}. Notie that
Φk ∈ R
3×1, let φ = (Φ0,Φ1,Φ2,Φ3). We perform the iterations (3.11)-(3.13) for 10 times, and get the
following are the 10 φ’s and the eigenvalues of the corresponding Ok, k = 0, 1, 2, 3,
φ =
 0.0335 −1.5771 −2.0518 1.0984−1.3337 0.5080 −0.3538 −0.2779
1.1275 0.2820 −0.8236 0.7015
 ,

0.0099, 0.0712, 0.2092 : eigenvalues of O0
0.1309, 0.0062, 0.0446 : eigenvalues of O1
0.0094, 0.0759, 0.2228 : eigenvalues of O2
0.0041, 0.0318, 0.0930 : eigenvalues of O3
φ =
 −0.5336 −0.8314 −0.2620 0.3502−2.0026 −0.9792 −1.7502 −0.2991
0.9642 −1.1564 −0.2857 0.0229
 ,

0.0549, 0.0040, − 0.0004 : O0,
0.0054, 0.0361, 0.1087 : O1,
0.0073, 0.0574, 0.1677 : O2,
0.0041, 0.0318, 0.0930 : O3,
φ =
 −0.5890 −0.7145 −0.7982 0.5201−0.2938 1.3514 1.0187 −0.0200
−0.8479 −0.2248 −0.1332 −0.0348
 ,

0.0199, 0.1601, 0.4696 : O0,
0.0129, 0.1032, 0.3022 : O1,
0.0080, 0.0630, 0.1843 : O2,
0.0041, 0.0318, 0.0930 : O3,
φ =
 −2.3299 −0.1765 0.3075 −1.1201−1.4491 0.7914 −1.2571 2.5260
0.3335 −1.3320 −0.8655 1.6555
 ,

0.0124, 0.0986, 0.2887 : O0,
0.0105, 0.0847, 0.2484 : O1,
0.0139, 0.1157, 0.3434 : O2,
0.0041, 0.0318, 0.0930 : O3,
φ =
 −0.3349 −1.3617 0.1837 0.39140.5528 0.4550 −0.4762 0.4517
1.0391 −0.8487 0.8620 −0.1303
 ,

0.0132, 0.1042, 0.3045 : O0,
0.0135, 0.1088, 0.3192 : O1,
0.0086, 0.0683, 0.2000 : O2,
0.0041, 0.0318, 0.0930 : O3,
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
φ =
 0.8261 −0.3031 −0.0679 −1.11761.5270 0.0230 −0.1952 1.2607
0.4669 0.0513 −0.2176 0.6601
 ,

0.0157, 0.1258, 0.3686 : O0,
0.0122, 0.0979, 0.2870 : O1,
0.2324, 0.0098, 0.0791 : O2,
0.0041, 0.0318, 0.0930 : O3,
φ =
 −0.9415 0.1352 −1.0298 −0.2097−0.1623 0.5152 0.9492 0.6252
−0.1461 0.2614 0.3071 0.1832
 ,

0.0218, 0.1776, 0.5230 : O0,
0.0143, 0.1158, 0.3401 : O1,
0.0088, 0.0701, 0.2053 : O2,
0.0041, 0.0318, 0.0930 : O3,
φ =
 −0.2490 −0.1922 −0.4838 −0.5320−1.0642 −0.2741 −0.7120 1.6821
1.6035 1.5301 −1.1742 −0.8757
 ,

0.0134, 0.1005, 0.2933 : O0,
0.0064, 0.0463, 0.1358 : O1,
0.0086, 0.0684, 0.2001 : O2,
0.0041, 0.0318, 0.0930 : O3,
φ =
 −1.2507 −0.2612 −0.4446 1.2347−0.9480 0.4434 −0.1559 −0.2296
−0.7411 0.3919 0.2761 −1.5062
 ,

0.0166, 0.1257, 0.3667 : O0,
0.0094, 0.0701, 0.2049 : O1,
0.0058, 0.0435, 0.1271 : O2,
0.0041, 0.0318, 0.0930 : O3,
φ =
 −0.0290 −1.0667 −3.0292 −0.50780.1825 0.9337 −0.4570 −0.3206
−1.5651 0.3503 1.2424 0.0125
 ,

0.0143, 0.1050, 0.3073 : O0,
0.0075, 0.0534, 0.1571 : O1,
0.0063, 0.0481, 0.1404 : O2,
0.0041, 0.0318, 0.0930 : O3.
For each φ, all the eigenvalues of Ok, k = 0, 1, 2, 3, are nonzero; this means that Ok, k = 0, 1, 2, 3, are all
invertible. Therefore, the corresponding (3.12) (3.13) are solvable. In addition, (3.11) is clearly solvable.
From Proposition 3.6, we know that for all the above 10 cases the mixed equilibrium solutions exist.
For example, with the last φ above, the mixed equilibrium solution is as follows. Let
Φ0 =
 −0.02900.1825
−1.5651
 , Φ1 =
 −1.06670.9337
0.3503
 ,
Φ2 =
 −3.0292−0.4570
1.2424
 , Φ3 =
 −0.5078−0.3206
0.0125
 ,
and
v
0,x
k = −(O
†
kLk +Φk)X
0,x,∗
k −O
†
kθk
with {
X
0,x,∗
k+1 =
(
sk −O
T
kO
†
kLk
)
X
0,x,∗
k −O
T
kO
†
kθk,
X
0,x,∗
0 = x, k = 0, 1, 2, 3,
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and
−O†0L0 =
 0.22740.3689
1.3137
 , −O†1L1 =
 0.36110.5858
2.0862
 ,
−O†2L2 =
 0.33820.5486
1.9537
 , −O†3L3 =
 0.47390.7689
2.7381
 ,
−O†0θ0 =
 0.21950.3561
1.2683
 , −O†1θ1 =
 0.35430.5747
2.0468
 ,
−O†2θ2 =
 0.33650.5460
1.9443
 , −O†3θ3 =
 0.47390.7689
2.7381
 .
Then, (Φ, v0,x) is a mixed equilibrium portfolio solution of Problem (MV) for (0, x), where Φ = {Φk, k =
0, 1, 2, 3}.
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